A cyclist in pain

A cyclist fell off his bike and is in pain, but because the pain is excruciating and lasts for a while, he finally convinces himself that he is in pain because he is actually a pedestrian who wanted to have a bike, he imagined that he had one, to come back to reality his conscience forced him to imagine that he was hurt by falling and he will continue to imagine this until he admits that he is a pedestrian –then only the pain will be forgotten.
All these, as we said, he believes, he considers true. But while he believes them to be true, he cannot admit that he is a pedestrian, because if he is finally convinced that he is a pedestrian, the bicycle will be lost and he will feel pain on account of it, and the new pain will make him (according to his aforementioned exegesis of pain) to consider now that his position is even worse, that he is required to admit other losses and this will not stop anywhere.
So the pain from something specific (falling off the bike) is first recognized as real because it exists, then as false, again because it exists (and does not cease to exist), but if voided as false will result in a new pain that is true only if the old pain was false, and if not voided as false the old pain will carry on as true.