The race-based admissions systems that respondents em- ploy also fail to comply with the twin commands of the Equal Protection Clause that race may never be used as a “negative” and that it may not operate as a stereotype.
First, our cases have stressed that an individual’s race may never be used against him in the admissions process. Here, however, the First Circuit found that Harvard’s con- sideration of race has led to an 11.1% decrease in the num- ber of Asian-Americans admitted to Harvard. 980 F. 3d, at 170, n. 29. And the District Court observed that Harvard’s “policy of considering applicants’ race . . . overall results in fewer Asian American and white students being admitted.” 397 F. Supp. 3d, at 178.
Yet by accepting race-based admissions programs in which some students may obtain preferences on the basis of race alone, respondents’ programs tolerate the very thing that Grutter foreswore: stereotyping. The point of respond- ents’ admissions programs is that there is an inherent ben- efit in race qua race—in race for race’s sake. Respondents admit as much. Harvard’s admissions process rests on the pernicious stereotype that “a black student can usually bring something that a white person cannot offer.” Bakke, 438 U. S., at 316 (opinion of Powell, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 20–1199, at 92. UNC is much the same. It argues that race in itself “says [something] about who you are.” Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 21–707, at 97; see also id., at 96 (analogizing being of a certain race to being from a rural area).
We have time and again forcefully rejected the notion that government actors may intentionally allocate prefer- ence to those “who may have little in common with one an- other but the color of their skin.” Shaw, 509 U. S., at 647. The entire point of the Equal Protection Clause is that treating someone differently because of their skin color is not like treating them differently because they are from a city or from a suburb, or because they play the violin poorly or well.
Most troubling of all is what the dissent must make these omissions to defend: a judiciary that picks winners and los- ers based on the color of their skin. While the dissent would certainly not permit university programs that discrimi- nated against black and Latino applicants, it is perfectly willing to let the programs here continue. In its view, this Court is supposed to tell state actors when they have picked the right races to benefit. Separate but equal is “inherently unequal,” said Brown. 347 U. S., at 495 (emphasis added).
For the reasons provided above, the Harvard and UNC admissions programs cannot be reconciled with the guaran- tees of the Equal Protection Clause. Both programs lack sufficiently focused and measurable objectives warranting the use of race, unavoidably employ race in a negative man- ner, involve racial stereotyping, and lack meaningful end points.
We have never permitted admissions programs to work in that way, and we will not do so today.
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinion...-1199_hgdj.pdf