The grandeur and misery of public diplomacy
The Alliance crystallizes the positions of numerous interest groups in the United States, Europe and Russia, to the extent that it may be asked whether the NATO-Russia relationship is not so much a matter of public diplomacy as it is a military issue. This weighs on the threats perceived by all actors and especially on the handling of crises from a media and hence an operational point of view, as was the case of the war in Georgia in 2008.
An ‘anti-Russian lobby’ exists in the United States.
[16] It includes three main groups: the ‘militarist hawks’ who view US hegemony in the world as natural; the ‘liberal hawks’ for whom America’s democratic values have a universal significance; and the ‘East-European nationalists’ for whom Russia is imperial by nature and incapable of transforming itself into a democratic system. This lobby, which is represented in most European capitals, sees NATO as a military, political and territorial spearhead, depending on the situation. It essentially considers Russia to be the principal obstacle to European security.
Conversely, Russia has a powerful ‘anti-Western’ lobby, which feels that NATO is seeking to encircle and bring down Russia. This lobby’s goal is to maintain a massive military machine and a political system organized around questions of security.
The dread of being encircled by the West has shaped Russia’s military representation of the world: progressive encirclement by NATO, with the power to project its resources. When these are deployed on the flanks of the Russian Federation, they can be used to strike deep into Russian territory.
Thus, while Washington sees NATO enlargement as contributing to geopolitical stability, for Moscow it is destabilizing and aggressive – though this should not give the impression that the relationship with NATO is monolithic.
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One school of thought in Russia, made up of ‘pragmatic nationalists,’ considers that Russia and NATO may agree to a balance aimed at preserving their respective spheres of influence. This group deplores the enlargement of the Alliance, but at the same time supports the development of NATO/Russia mechanisms.
A second school of thought draws together ‘liberal Westerners’ for whom membership of NATO and acceptance of Western values should have guided Russian foreign policy. This group is clearly in a minority position on Russia’s political chessboard, and was particularly weakened by the Kosovo campaign in 1999. It may split up on the question of possible NATO membership.
The third school of thought brings together the ‘nationalist fundamentalists’ who believe that the Alliance is forever planning the invasion of Russia. This group is present in parliament and is used to brandishing the NATO menace, and the possible breaking-up of the Slavic world, before every set of elections.