Kant :\

[Kyriakos]

Well, i am forced by various powers of the universe to continue presenting things from one of the most boringly written philosophical works of all time, namely Kant's 'critique of pure reason'

Part of a brief presentation of enlightenment era philosophy (and that bordering the era).

So the thread can include my synopsis of this work, although i do not profess to be more aware of Kantianism than people who read more of his works. However, some things do immediately stand out, if one has read some philosophy, and particularly for myself what does stand out (negatively) in Kant is his very deductive way of thinking when he examines dialectic stuff.

Ok, the above was not english, so what i mean by that is that Kant was of the view one can isolate knowledge in particular fields, without that being to the detriment of said fields or of our notion of knowledge. Eg he is fine with claiming we have a knowledge of 5+7=12 (not a chance example, he uses this in his treatise), or that we have a knowledge that stuff in the external world have weight (again, not a chance example), but doesn't seem to care about not being able (again in text) to provide a definition of truth regardless of truth being tied to a set object of examination. Eg (again in english) Kant argues that while you can know a truth tied to something specific and in that context (for example that an object in the external world has weight), you cannot know what truth is isolated from any object of examination.

This isn't an argument he happens to make; it is very crucial in his overall philosophy. The idea itself that truth is only specific in context, is obviously not new. Yet Kant goes on to claim that any search of 'truth' as a notion itself, is futile. That is sort of new, but more importantly it is (imo) poor philosophy, given 'truth' is again a notion in our intellect, thus it is merely of a different type than what is sensed of it when tied in specific context. Kant, to be brief, argues in favour of an axiomatic system of logic (again not new, and very Aristotelian), yet (iirc in these exact words) considers dialectic to be an illusion and a mocking of logic. What follows is a definition of dialectic, since that is a term not very known to people outside philosophy

Dialectic is attributed to Zeno of Elea (by Aristotle) and generally is a system of thinking where no axiom is accepted. This means there is no stable basis. It is also why of the two methods of dialectic thinking (both attributed to Zeno) only one is part of math, namely the famous 'reductio ad absurdum', ie the method where one examines the consequences that a position theorised as true would have, and if those consequences are found to be false it follows that the position was also false.
The other method in dialectic is to examine the basis of the given position (it is somewhat the opposite, given the former was to examine the consequences/extensions of the position). Yet try to do this in math: "well, i was asked to show that the pythagorean theorem is true in eucledian geometry, but i will now place the axioms of that geometry into question" Intelligent, yet the math test score won't be good for you :o

Kant seems to be mostly based on Aristotle, which isn't much of a surprise, given he examines logic (set axiom-base thinking) and attacks dialectic thinking, like Aristotle first did. He also tries (like Aristotle) to deduce conclusions of the more general, from the more specific, and/or categorically claim that if that is not possible in cases then it follows we just cannot know then. A serious issue with this approach, though, is that it creates a neat model where the edges of our experience/consciousness are presented as very stable and basic and evidently true, while things get blurrier progressively the more theoretical you get. However it does not at all seem evident that this is a result of a reality, or merely a result of the way you set your system of thinking.

Post got too long, doubt it will be even read... You can discuss about Kant or any of the other issues presented. Not sure if there will be a fruitful discussion, but i thought of sharing..

[Diamat]

Kant is not completely wrong. The phenomenal nature of truth is not necessarily a mistaken notion. However, Kant makes a crucial error: he continues to maintain the thing-in-itself (Ding an sich) existing, somehow, beyond the spiritual, in a pure form, even though we can never know it as such (and hence would never even know whether it even is a 'thing'). Another error concerns morality. Kant is unable to explain why a certain morality is true and better than another. When it comes to specifics of morality, he merely talks about his personal Vorstellungen (ideas).

[Kyriakos]

Re the Thing-in-itself, i am not aware if he uses it entirely as Plato did -it seems he uses it like Aristotle- (eg the dialogue between Parmenides and Socrates uses that notion literally tens of times). In the ancient pre-aristotelian manner, the thing-in-itself is only a point on our mental horizon, ie the idea that any object you have views of, attribute qualities to and so on, in an over-reality has different forms/elements, cause (logical) we form the object in our human intellect and thus inevitably it gets qualities we can identify due to our mind/receptive organs feed.

An issue here is that - inevitably - the thing-in-itself can only be picked up as another idea in our mind. Parmenides tries in that dialogue (The Parmenides-- on Ideas) to specifically defend against the notion that 'one should just say this exists but we cannot know anything of it', and does so in 40 pages of monologue

Aristotle also uses a version of the thing-in-itself which seems far closer to Kant, given Aristotle - like Kant - claims that we are somehow tied to the reality of the thing-in-itself, since (not a good view in my opinion) we get to notice some reality of it through our understanding of its matter, while the reality of the form is utterly unknown to us. This is a watered down version of Platonic philosophy on this. Let alone of Eleatic (Parmenides-Zeno etc), given the eleatic philosophers claim that not only we likely have no knowledge of anything external, but we likely have no knowledge of a reality (which they argued was stable, just not part of us) through any thoughts we might make.

[Sir Adrian]

Kant is not completely wrong. The phenomenal nature of truth is not necessarily a mistaken notion. However, Kant makes a crucial error: he continues to maintain the thing-in-itself (Ding an sich) existing, somehow, beyond the spiritual, in a pure form, even though we can never know it as such (and hence would never even know whether it even is a 'thing'). Another error concerns morality. Kant is unable to explain why a certain morality is true and better than another. When it comes to specifics of morality, he merely talks about his personal Vorstellungen (ideas).

I kant understand how one morality be true and the other false.

[DaniCatBurger]

I kant understand how one morality be true and the other false.

A proper ethical statement has the form of a necessary and conflict free claim in practical hindsight. Other ethical statements can be not necessary or not conflict free or both but will be insufficient to support generalising claims in practical hindsight. A proper ethical statement has the power to serve as a rule and can be generalised in practical hindsight. It means in respect to the question that moralities (statements of values and norms) are measured and qualified in relation to a proper ethical statement that by itself can be no longer brought back to another purpose than its original one. An example would be the situation of a person to be murdered, asking the murderer not to murder. “Do not murder!” is a proper ethical statement. Its purpose is indeed no other than not to murder or not to be murdered. You can extend this with other examples such as “Do not steal!”, “Do not beat people!”, or what someone wrote on his hands with the felt pen שנאה היא לא ערך, גזענות היא לא הדרך etc. What is thought to be so difficult about Kant?

[Kyriakos]

One might ask another not to murder, cause he wants to cut a limb of their victim while keeping the victim alive

Logic is not really applicable to ethics, cause it is primarily about sense of objects and not about objects themselves in a sentence. Logic can include both, but not just the sense.

[DaniCatBurger]

Logic is not really applicable to ethics, cause it is primarily about sense of objects and not about objects themselves in a sentence. Logic can include both, but not just the sense.

Kant considers ethics as a practical philosophy close to the studies of the laws. Laws consist in formalised statements. Logic can be part of the investigation of ethical arguments (sequences of formalised statements), e.g. as a deontology. When you investigate ethics in a Kantian tradition like the early Lévinas, and the examples come from there, then you would refer to the conditions of the original ethical statement, the request that is mirrored in the face and eyes.

One might ask another not to murder, cause he wants to cut a limb of their victim while keeping the victim alive.

Treating the Other Merely as a Means. Kantian ethics remain relevant.

Moral acts stand under the rule of freedom and not the necessity of nature in Kantian language. There is this photo with the Russian POW at a fence and Heinrich Himmler. Which one is free? None possibly, but the latter has not even arrived at asking the question or it would not be obvious to us at least.

[DaniCatBurger]

... double post ...

[Diamat]

I kant understand how one morality be true and the other false.

Hegel actually distinguishes between morality (Moralität) and ethics (Sittlichkeit). Ethics is the higher moment. Whereas morality is individual morality, ethics is universal, that is, ethics extends beyond just one individual and is intersubjective. Ethics, in its highest form, is represented by the nation, since it refers to the customs (Sitten) of a particular group (e.g., the nation). Hence, ethics should be an individual's final guide, since it allows for the congruence of particular and universal (in relation to the national community), whereas morality, in and by itself, can sometimes represent a mere Vorstellung (personal idea).

Hegel, unlike commonly thought, is a pretty down-to-Earth guy. His philosophy is common sense (once you get past the vocabulary he employs).