The various strands of war are admirably drawn together in Philippe Contamine’s classic,
War in the Middle Ages (Blackwell, 1984; translated by Michael Jones). This authoritative overview stresses the interconnection of war with society as a whole, rightly holding that war is ‘the product of a whole cultural, technical and economic environment’. He places war against the background of the commercial revolution and changes in government and administration in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the outcome of which was an increasingly monetised society.
Perhaps the most obvious implication of a money economy for war was the emergence of the permanent armies identified with the early modern period. In this light the innovative indenture system of Edward I (1272-1307) is seen as instrumental in heralding the eventual decline of the feudal summons in favour of more professional, paid forces. This belief is countered in an important recent book edited by Matthew Strickland,
Anglo-Norman Warfare (Boydell, 1992), which makes accessible to a wider audience a collection of eclectic academic articles by specialists, primarily written during the last fifteen years. Where recognition has been given to medieval warfare for proficient recruitment; the use of effective infantry, archery and dismounted knights, competent leadership and strategy, and the chevauchée, historians have tended to date these developments from the later Middle Ages, and especially from the revolution in tactics and organisation under Edward I. The contributors to Anglo-Norman Warfare trace these developments to an earlier period, encouraging debate between early and late medievalists (...)