At first, the Fatimid regime relied on an elaborate administrative system to exploit the Nile’s water. During the reign of al-Hakim, in Upper Egypt, a man of science, thought to have been Ibn al-Haytham (1039 AD), considered utilising the water level drop at the first cataract to regulate the flow of the Nile and make the area the source of perennial agriculture. Sources suggest that the famous mathematician had been wooed to Egypt by al-Hakim for the project but when the task proved unfeasible Ibn al-Haytham fled Egypt and returned only after the imam-caliph’s death. Foremost amongst the government responsibilities was the maintenance of irrigation canals. From the Nile, canals would irrigate villages and, if necessary, water could be raised via hydraulic pulls. Villages were built above the river level and during the inundation period, they would be linked by boat service. A land track along the river also served as road and, ac-cording to Nasir-i Khusraw, the treasury would pay an officer 10,000 dinars for its maintenance. Egypt possessed an unmatched system of waterways and its economic ascendance over its neighbours was owed partly to this advantage. The Fatimids appear to have privileged the maintenance of some canal networks over others: during their rule, the irrigation system of the Fayyum region declined dramatically. At the same time, the area remained an important centre for the cultivation of flax, thus indicating that resources were destined to favour the production of some crops over others.
Plans did not always come to fruition. Often time, the Nile underperformed with disastrous consequences for the population at large and for thefortunes of the dynasty. The Nile failed, intermittently during al-Hakim’s reign; at least one major shortfall took place during al-Zahir’s reign; a low Nile occurred in the early years of al-Mustansir’s rule (1036 AD – 1094 AD). On all these occasions, famine, plagues, price inflation and widespread death occurred. None of these events, though, compared with the total economic, social and political collapse that coincided with a catastrophic uninterrupted sequence of low Nile years, from 1063 AD to 1072 AD. This period, known as the shidda, featured the worst ever performance in the entire recorded history of the river. On occasions, the imam-caliphs addressed these crises with drastic policies on the distribution of commodities such as wheat of which, by the way, they were the wholesalers. In 1009 AD, al-Hakim – typically vilified in anti-Fatimid sources – was hailed as the people’s saviour for devising a system that ensured equal distribution of wheat whilst preventing price speculation. Al-Mustansi’s policies were not so effective: in 1052 AD for example, a price reduction battle erupted between traders in the market that caused a deflation in the value of wheat resulting in major shortages. These incidents are revealing because they tells us something about the consequences of a crucial investment strategy that the Fatimids adopted upon becoming rulers in Egypt. The Fatimids increasingly limited the growth of wheat in favour of flax crops. Whilst domestic wheat cultivation did not stop completely, extensive land previously used for grain came to be used to farm mostly flax (and other industrial crops like sugar to supply the regime-owned profitable textile industry and export in general. In principle, this policy made sense as, in theory, it freed the regime cultivation programme from its dependency on the unpredictability of the river and consequent market instability as supplier of the main staple food. Industrial crops could guarantee a regular flow of money to the regime, part of which the ruler could use to import extra wheat when needed by retaining, consolidating and perpetuating control of North Africa, Sicily, Syria and trade treaties with Byzantium. Privileging industrial crops paid off as it favoured farmers whilst procuring the regime revenues from land tax, retailing of crops and exports of finished products, but it also meant that when the Nile was low and the arable land at disposal was limited, famine erupted because no sufficient land was made available for growing wheat. Lack of grain meant insufficient fodder for farming animals, setting off a vicious cycle. High mortality meant that even when land would become available, there would be insufficient people to farm it as indeed al-Maqrizi had observed. When phases of low Nile coincided with poor state planning of wheat stock reserves, adverse geo-climatic conditions across the Eastern Mediterranean regions and volatility in geopolitical relations between the Fatimids and their rival dynasties in the Mediterranean (e.g. loss of influence in North Africa as well as loss of control of Sicily and Syria and the breakdown of trade alliances with Byzantium, as for example in 1055 AD) hampered grain import into Egypt, the consequences for the people were catastrophic.
A low Nile certainly had negative repercussions on the economy as a whole. But as the decision of what, where and how much to grow was determined in advance, it is evident that the regime chose to give precedence to industrial crops that were not perishable and generated money even when, for the sake of public welfare, food crops should have been favoured. Ultimately, it was the regime’s self-interest and short-termism that generated long-term damage rather than the river’s poor performance alone. That trading interest prevailed over public welfare is indicated by the fact that in the aftermath of “bad” Nile years the production and trading of flax and its finished products as well as other industrial crops do not appear to have been majorly affected, as one can infer, for example, from the lack of reference to this predicament in the Geniza documents. To the Fatimids, the Nile was not so much the “bread basket of Egypt » but rather the north–south highway that allowed them to be strong international commercial players. They became suppliers of desirable goods and holders of the monopoly on the trade transiting between Indian Ocean ports, East African trading posts and the Mediterranean regions. Archaeological evidence shows, for example, that direct and intense trade occurred between Fatimid and Swahili traders during the 10th and 11th centuries. Fatimid merchants were mainly interested in the Swahili’s supply of gold, ivory and rock crystal. The Fatimid’s access to ivory contributed to a flourishing of Egyptian ivory carving and, by default, to a similar blossoming in Byzantium, Norman Sicily and al-Andalus. The Fatimid rule in Egypt coincided (or generated) therefore with the considerable expansion of the commercial axis that led from Fustat, via the Nile, to the Red Sea ports such as Aydhab (and later Qusair al-Qadim) and then to Aden and beyond. By combining economic and political pressures, with the adoption of an enticing custom duties policy that treated non-Muslims traders as equals to their Muslims counterparts, the Fatimids ostensibly managed to divert the trade away from the alternative Abbasid-controlled Persian Gulf route. Even if this rival route to Iraq along the Persian Gulf did not totally disappear, it declined when compared with the Fatimid-controlled one, which benefitted from (or contributed to) a simultaneous commercial resurgence of both the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean spheres. The Fatimid capital became the nerve centre of the commercial exchange for goods to and from the Mediterranean, via Alexandria, thanks to the Nile harbours of Fustat and Cairo. In Upper Egypt, the Nile’s main commercial terminals were Aswan first and, later, Qus. The Fatimids’ efforts in securing administrative and military control of these commercial stations in the south changed the role that the river would play in Egypt as a whole: the upper stretch of the Nile valley was no longer left to its own devices as it had been mostly the case until the 10th century.
In Conclusion, the Fatimids endured the worst performances of the Nile ever recorded in history, yet managed to turn the river into an avenue for international commercial success. In the midst of this natural calamity, the Fatimids mixed misjudgement in agricultural policies for the exploitation of the land along the Nile valley (only 2 millions km2 of cultivated lands on 28 millions available – from another source) with shrewd trading tactics that enabled them to overshadow their Abbasid rivals. The story of the Fatimids and the Nile resonates with current concerns about the interrelation between the rise and fall of political powers vis-à-vis the effects of climate change ; the impact of financial risk-taking on the general public; the logic behind decision-making on matters of land management and water resources; the dilemma of choosing between free trade and protectionism; and the opportunities but also challenges of adopting socio-political and economic systems that favour international mobility of human resources. The Fatimids faced these challenges with whatever instruments we are told were available to them be they perfuming rituals or sophisticated know-how. The history of Egypt under the Fatimids coincides with a unique convergence of events over a span of some 200 years in the pre-modern Islamic period: ruled by a unique Shi‘i dynasty, operating in a unique geographical setting, faced with a unique climatic/hydrological predicament and uniquely placed as intermediary between the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean worlds. Further interdisciplinary investigation into the role of the Nile in the life of the dynasty may well yield a significant re-appraisal of the Fatimids and their role in Islamic history as a whole.
Re: Economic 'weight' of different regions - is Egypt under represented?
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Originally Posted by Marius Marich
), we could easily find information about Fatimids, Ayyubids, Seljuks, Rûm, Kwarezms, Abbasids and others. But for Zengids, it was quite complicated.
